they entered Harvard. “Whatever our experience before we came together,” notes Charles Flood in the prologue, “all of us understood that tyranny had been defeated only by a willingness to serve in the massive and dedicated effort to destroy it.”

In his entry, John Walcott describes the battleground of Pork Chop Hill. During one brutal assault, Chinese soldiers “were tossing grenades through the firing slits and jumping into the trenches, creating panic and confusion while the main body of the assault ran down their hill and up ours,” he writes. “They just kept coming and enough got through to overwhelm the defenders… I never saw a live Chinese soldier and that was good, because by the time you did see one, it was dark, he was 10 feet away, and he was trying to kill you.” A friend died in a subsequent counterattack. For his part, John Palladino writes that he learned “simple lessons of life” while in the army—that “skin is waterproof and that sleeping in a floating barge with rats that ate the bindings of my books… can be an adventure…. I was toughened and ready for the world, a much more mature young man.”

The book recognizes seven classmates killed in action: six in Korea, including Marine lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner Jr., who was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor for throwing himself on a grenade to protect his men; and one in a terrorist attack. CIA officer Richard Welch was assassinated outside his home in Athens in 1975 in an attack planned by “a small band of Greeks angry about U.S. support of the junta that ruled Greece harshly for several years leading up to 1973,” writes Christopher May, Welch’s roommate. The killers were finally caught 30 years later.

A number of the 200 class members or their survivors who contributed short essays never saw front-line combat in Korea. Some served military tours on domestic soil, in Europe, Asia, or in the Middle East, while others served as diplomats or federal policymakers, or with nongovernmental organizations. Army veteran Frederick S. Wyle held various posts in the government, including service as deputy assistant secretary of defense (1965-1969); during that period, he helped shape nuclear weapons policy with NATO allies. Back then, he writes, “it was the Europeans, not the U.S., who wanted to rely on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets from any adventurous behavior in Europe.” He credits Robert McNamara (“leaving aside his role in the ‘Vietnam debacle’) with convincing the Europeans and NATO allies that this reliance “was a bad idea, since the consequences of their use were so terrible and unpredictable.”

Also active in the Kennedy administration was William R. Polk, who served on the Policy Planning Council and worked in Iran and Afghanistan. He writes: “The shah once told me that I was the only American official who spoke to him as an adult, man to man, but he did not like the message I brought—that if the military grew rapidly and was not balanced by the less glamorous, less favored countervailing institutions such as the parliament, the judiciary, and the free press, Iran would sooner or later…be convulsed with revolution.”

Richard W. Murphy spent his 34-year State Department career focused on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli peace process. In 1988, after Jordan’s King Hussein renounced claims to the West Bank, Murphy recalls that indirect phone negotiations with Yasser Arafat, aimed at opening a dialogue, left the Palestine Lib-